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The child support reform provisions within the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) have been markedly successful in 
improving child support enforcement efforts. Child support is an important part of the 
mix of supports necessary to assist welfare recipients to make the transition to work and 
self-sufficiency. Now, post-PRWORA, there is a greater focus on the low-income fathers 
who are expected to pay child support.  
 
This report examines the treatment of low-income fathers in the child support system in 
the U.S. and how the system could be improved. The report suggests that the time of 
establishment of the child support order and shortly thereafter is the key time for the 
child support agency to establish a more positive relationship with low-income fathers. 
Improving this “up-front” process could increase both financial and emotional support 
for children. The report analyzes default order practices, examines best state practices, 
and reviews and analyzes selected international practices. The report includes 
recommendations for child support programs, state legislative action, and federal action. 
The analysis concludes that three changes to the child support system are of particular 
importance: 1) reducing the proportion of orders entered by default; 2) setting realistic 
child support orders at the outset; and 3) making adjustments to orders to reflect 
changes in circumstances.      
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More than half the children born today are likely to spend some time in a single parent 
family. Children in these families—most of which are headed by mothers—face a much 
higher risk of living in poverty. Having financial support from both parents can make a 
difference if these children are going to have a realistic chance to escape poverty. Child 
support provides the transfer mechanism for fathers to contribute to the financial 
support of children in single parent families.1 
 
Child support has become even more important in the post-welfare reform era as more 
and more single parent families move off the welfare rolls. Child support is sometimes 
called the “last safety net” for low-income, single parent families, now faced with time 
limits in Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) programs. Child support is a 
critical source of financial support for these low-income families struggling to combine 
work with non-welfare supports—such as childcare, health care, and tax credits—in an 
effort to climb out of poverty. Yet, despite major improvements in child support 
enforcement in the past decade, far too many poor, single parent families do not receive 
the child support to which they are entitled. 
 
There is also a growing recognition that, in addition to financial support, children need 
the connection with and the emotional support of both parents. Sometimes, however, 
the child support system is not supportive of fathers’ efforts to provide emotional 
support to their children. So the child support system faces a tough challenge—
increasing the amount of financial support provided by fathers, who are often poor 
themselves, while at the same time encouraging the emotional connection between 
fathers and their children. 
 
The policy community has begun to reevaluate the potential role of low-income 
noncustodial fathers in the lives of their children. Many commentators have called for an 
increase in services to these fathers to assist them in contributing to the emotional and 
financial support of their children. Recent policy initiatives have been based upon the 
premise that the birth of the child presents a unique opportunity to get young, unwed 
fathers involved in their children’s lives and to increase their ability to support their 
children. Indeed, there is research to suggest that the birth of the child may be a “magical 
moment” when the relationship between the father, mother, and child is at a peak.2 




Interventions to build upon and strengthen the family relationship at this point have 
promising potential. 
 
But while the child’s birth may be a “magical moment” in terms of the parents’ 
relationship, it may not be the most opportune moment for the child support agency to 
get involved. Even when an unwed father acknowledges paternity in the hospital, a child 
support order is usually not entered until much later. So the child support agency’s 
involvement with the parents may be minimal or non-existent at the time of birth. The 
key time for the child support agency is most often when the child support order is 
established and shortly thereafter. This is when the agency has a clear mission and 
motive to work with the family. It is the “opportune moment” for the child support 
agency to establish a positive relationship with the parents and will often determine 
whether child support will be paid voluntarily, or whether an antagonistic relationship 
will develop between the agency and the noncustodial parent.  
 
This report examines this key aspect of child support enforcement.  The premise is that 
if this “up-front” process is improved, the child support program can strengthen the 
relationship between the father, mother and child, as well as increase voluntary 
compliance with child support obligations. This could ultimately increase both financial 
and emotional support for children. 
 
In order to better understand this up-front process, Policy Studies Inc., with funding 
from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, initiated a project to learn more about the up-
front processes that states are using and to advise them on how to improve their 
processes. This effort included: 
 
9 An analysis of practices on the use of default orders; 
9 An examination of best state practices; and 
9 A review and analysis of selected international practices. 
 
This report begins with a review of the importance of child support to single parent 
families in the post-welfare reform era. Then, two major problems with the child support 
system are discussed: 1) the low payment rate on current support obligations; and 2) the 
possibility that the child support system alienates some fathers from their children. This 
report proposes that these problems stem from how noncustodial fathers, and 
particularly low-income noncustodial fathers, are treated initially when the child support 
obligation is established and in the first months thereafter. Then, this report discusses 
three major areas where state child support programs could improve in working with 
low-income noncustodial parents to get them started on the right track: 
 




9 Establishing realistic expectations for low-income fathers;  
9 Encouraging voluntary compliance with child support obligations; and 
9 Responding to the changing circumstances of low-income parents. 
 
Throughout this report, recommendations are offered for practices to improve the 
system in each of these areas, and the report ends with a summary of recommendations 
for child support programs, state legislative action, and federal action. This report 
focuses on opportunities to assist low-income fathers in meeting their responsibilities 
and making a stronger connection with their children, while also increasing the financial 
support to children. PSI’s analysis concludes that three specific changes to the child 
support system are of particular importance: 1) reducing the proportion of orders 
entered by default; 2) setting realistic child support orders at the outset; and 3) making 
adjustments to orders to reflect changes in circumstances. These changes would make 
the child support system more fair and equitable to low-income noncustodial fathers, 
while improving the well-being of children through increased voluntary compliance with 
current support obligations. While the recommendations are focused on assisting low-
income fathers in the child support system, they are not intended to decrease but to 
increase overall child support payments to custodial parents and their children.  
 
For the most part, the recommendations in this report are not difficult to implement, 
and do not require changes in state or federal law. Moreover, wholesale changes to the 
child support system are not necessary. What is required, though, is recognition of the 
plight of low-income noncustodial fathers, leadership at the state and local level, and a 
willingness to try a different approach.  





THE IMPORTANCE OF CHILD SUPPORT TO SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 
 
The Impact of Welfare Reform 
 
The welfare reform bill passed in 1996—the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)—included the most comprehensive child 
support reform measures ever enacted in the United States. These measures affect far 
more people than just those receiving assistance through the TANF program. 
Approximately 40 million people—custodial and noncustodial parents and their 
children—were impacted by the new child support measures. Yet, while the changes to 
welfare are well known and have been the subject of intense study and debate, far less 
attention has been given to child support enforcement. This is unfortunate because child 
support has become even more important for low-income families in the post-welfare 
reform world.  
 
Welfare reform has transformed the traditional welfare program of the past into a short-
term program intended to assist recipients in a transition to work. Welfare recipients are 
faced with time limits, and states are expected to move welfare recipients quickly into 
work. Support outside the traditional welfare system has been greatly expanded in order 
to assist low-income wage earners. These supports include expanded health care for 
children (Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program—SCHIP), 
expanded child care benefits, and a significantly increased Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). Child support is an important part of this mix of supports. Research suggests 
that the receipt of child support is important to assist welfare recipients to leave welfare 
for work, remain off of welfare once they have left, and to reduce poverty.3 A recent 
Urban Institute study showed that child support represented 26 percent of a family’s 
income ($1,979 in 1996) for those low-income families who receive child support.4 In 
these families, child support was a more important source of income than cash 
assistance. For those poor children who receive child support but not welfare, child 
support represented over one-third of their annual family income ($2,674 in 1996).   
 
Research also shows that child support enforcement has other positive effects on child 
outcomes, including educational attainment.5 Most recently, child support enforcement 
has received attention as a means to promote marriage. There is some evidence, although 
not conclusive, suggesting that child support enforcement may decrease out-of-wedlock 
births and divorces.6  
 
Connecting Fathers and Children 
 
Besides the financial benefit to children, child support is now viewed within the larger 
lens of the father and child connection. There are widely-recognized benefits of the 




involvement of fathers in their children’s lives. Involvement of fathers in a healthy 
parent-child relationship has significant benefits for children, including reduced out-of-
wedlock childbearing, high school drop-out rates, substance abuse, and juvenile 
delinquency. The child support enforcement program is increasingly seen as a potential 
avenue to strengthen the relationship of fathers and children, particularly for “fragile 
families.” The term “fragile families” describes non-marital family relationships where 
the noncustodial parent, usually the father, maintains a relationship with the child by 
living with the mother outside of marriage (cohabitation) or through significant 
visitation.7  
 
Most fathers, even in cases of out-of-wedlock births, have a connection with their child 
at birth. They indicate that they want to provide for the support of their child, and most 
are willing to acknowledge paternity. In-hospital paternity establishment programs, 
required under federal law since 1993, attempt to build upon this connection at birth.8 
These programs require states to have procedures in place to offer unmarried fathers and 
mothers the opportunity to acknowledge paternity within birthing hospitals. These 
programs have been remarkably successful in increasing the number of paternities 
established.  
 
Researchers and policymakers have termed the birth of the child “the magical moment,” 
and see it as an opportunity to go beyond the acknowledgment of paternity and as a 
unique opportunity to encourage the involvement of young, unwed fathers in their 
young children’s lives and to increase their ability to support their children. Recent 
program initiatives, such as the Partners for Fragile Families, are based on this premise. 9  
Such interventions certainly appear to have merit. Yet, the time of birth may not be the 
most opportune moment for the child support agency to get involved. In-hospital 
paternity acknowledgments establish paternity, but do not establish a financial obligation 
for child support (order). Paternity acknowledgments are usually obtained by hospital 
staff, not child support caseworkers. Establishing child support orders is a legal process 
that follows, usually much later.10 The key time for the child support agency is most 
often when the child support order is initially established and in the months immediately 
afterwards. This is when the agency has a clear mission and motive to work with the 
family.  





PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM 
 
Despite Improvement, Two Prominent Problems Remain 
 
Child support collections in this country have increased as a result of child support 
reform efforts. Collections increased from $8 billion in 1992 to $18 billion in 2000. 
Paternity establishments have tripled from 500,000 to 1.5 million during the same period. 
Despite this progress, two prominent problems still exist with the current child support 
system. First, collection rates on “current support” continue to be far too low. “Current 
support” is the amount that is due for the current month, as opposed to arrears (past due 
support) for previous months. Only approximately 59 percent of current support is paid 
in the United States.11 As a result, millions of low-income, custodial parents and children 
do not receive the child support they need to improve their financial security. About 26 
percent of custodial parents and their children live below poverty, and about one-fourth 
of all custodial parents with child support agreements or awards and who are due 
support receive no child support at all.12  
 
The second prominent problem with the child support system is more subtle, but equally 
of concern. Some researchers and observers contend that the system can actually drive 
fathers—especially young, low-income, unwed fathers—away from their children. In 
their view, this happens because fathers are saddled with unrealistic child support orders. 
Unrealistic orders result from policies such as default orders, retroactive support orders, 
and income imputation that increase the amount of arrears beyond a father’s capacity to 
pay. Faced with obligations in the thousands of dollars at the outset, poor unwed fathers 
are sometimes driven further into poverty or into the underground economy and often 
become resentful of the mother and even more disengaged with their children.  
 
These two problems with the child support system—the low rate of payments of current 
support and the system’s causing fathers to become alienated—are two sides of the same 
coin. Both problems stem in large part from how the child support system treats fathers 
“up front” when paternity and a court order are established, and during the first critical 
months afterwards. When the initial treatment of fathers drives them away from the 
mothers and their children, and sometimes into the underground economy, these fathers 
then fail to make current child support payments, leaving mothers and children without 
the financial support they need. Everyone suffers. If this upfront process can be 
improved, the system could potentially benefit low-income fathers and increase the 









Two Possible Approaches 
 
Sometimes noncustodial parents intentionally refuse to pay child support, and coercive 
enforcement measures are necessary. If a noncustodial parent has the ability to pay 
support—but refuses to—most agree that he should be held responsible by whatever 
means can be brought to bear. However, current child support practices often create an 
antagonistic relationship with the noncustodial parent from the beginning, rather than 
encourage the voluntary payment of child support. Consider the following hypothetical, 
but realistic case: 
 
John and his girlfriend, Mary, have a child born out-of-wedlock. They still see each 
other often, and John has bought diapers and other items for the child. John has had 
a sporadic work history. After several months of unemployment, John finds a part-
time job as a security guard. Mary receives welfare from the state. One day, a process 
server unexpectedly serves John with a Summons and Complaint for paternity and 
child support by leaving a copy under his door. When he looks at the papers, they 
are long, complicated, and written in legal language he does not fully understand. He 
does understand that his girlfriend has named him as the father. However, he does 
not understand the reason this is necessary or that the welfare department has 
required Mary to name the father. This confusion strains his relationship with Mary 
and he begins to see her and the child less often. The papers require John to go to 
the courthouse downtown and pay a $200 filing fee to contest the case. Since John 
believes he is the father, and he does not have money for the filing fee or a lawyer, 
he does not file the necessary legal papers in response to the action. Thirty days later, 
unbeknownst to John, the court enters a default order for $400 per month in child 
support, imputing income for John equal to a full time job, and the court orders 
retroactive support of $3,000. Six months go by, and John is unexpectedly 
summoned to his employer’s office. His employer informs him that more than half 
of his wages will be garnished to pay the child support he owes, which now totals 
$5,400. John gets discouraged and angered. He quits his job, quits seeing Mary and 
his child, and works only occasionally putting up sheetrock for a contractor while 
getting paid under the table.  
 
In contrast, consider this alternative approach on how the case could be handled:  
 
The child support worker approaches both John and Mary in a non-threatening 
manner before any legal action is started. The need for child support and the child 
support process are explained to John in straightforward terms. John is offered 
employment and training services so that he can better support himself and his child 
in the future. John and Mary are encouraged to work on their relationship and are 
referred to local community agencies or churches for parenting classes. If 





appropriate to their circumstances, the potential benefits of marriage are also 
explained to John and Mary.  A $150 child support obligation is ordered based upon 
child support guidelines that take into account how much he can realistically afford 
to pay at the present time. If his income rises in the future, John agrees to pay more. 
No retroactive support is ordered. John is treated as a customer of the child support 
agency and the child support worker is trained to use a “soft glove” approach as long 
as payments are made voluntarily. Special child support teams work closely with John 
in the first few months after the establishment of the order to assist him in meeting 
his obligations. John continues to pay child support voluntarily even after his job 
increases to full time and his obligation increases. The relationship between John, 
Mary, and the child is strengthened.  
 
Attributes of the System that Contribute to the Problems 
 
There are three major attributes of the current child support system that can contribute 
to driving low-income fathers away and discouraging current support payments: 
 
9 Child support order amounts may not be realistic given the financial circumstances of low-income 
fathers. Child support orders may be set too high when entered because child support 
guidelines are not sensitive enough to the financial circumstances of low-income 
fathers. More likely, unrealistic child support orders may result from policies that 
promote the heavy use of default orders, include excessive retroactive support in 
initial orders, and impute (assume) income. 
 
9 The child support system does not promote voluntary compliance with child support obligations. The 
child support system often focuses on the collection of arrears (past-due support), 
rather than promoting voluntary compliance with child support obligations and 
helping to increase the capacity of fathers to pay support. 
 
9 The child support system does not respond to changing circumstances of low-income parents. When 
child support obligations are set too high initially due to default orders and imputing 
income—or when the father experiences adverse changes in employment status—
the system is very slow to adjust the order amount based upon new income 
information.  
 




What Are Realistic Expectations for Low-Income Fathers? 
 
All of these attributes raise the central question of what society should expect of fathers, 
particularly low-income fathers. The child support system is built upon the premise that 
society should demand responsibility from fathers, but it has struggled to define the 
parameters of that responsibility. Exactly how much responsibility is realistic to expect 
from low-income noncustodial fathers? What should be the expectation for their work 
and earnings? Many low-income noncustodial fathers have poor educations and limited 
work histories. Should society have the same expectations as it would for better-educated 
and higher-income fathers? Moreover, many of these fathers have a poor understanding 
of the legal system, distrust for legal authorities, and little or no access to legal assistance. 
What should be the expectations for these fathers in dealing with the legal system that 
establishes child support orders?  
 
Child support agencies have generally focused on collecting support from fathers, and 
not on increasing the capacity of those fathers to pay support. Yet, many young, unwed 
fathers have difficulty supporting themselves, much less supporting a child. Mincy and 
Sorensen estimate that at least 16.2 percent, and possibly as much as 33.2 percent, of 
young noncustodial fathers do not pay child support and are unable to do so without 
further impoverishing themselves.13 These fathers tend to be young, disproportionately 
African-American, and have a limited education.14 Only 43 percent of low-income 
nonpaying fathers work in the labor market, and one-third has not held a job for more 
than three years.15 They face the same types of barriers to employment as mothers who 
are welfare recipients. There is a growing recognition that these low-income fathers need 
the same kinds of employment and family services that are made available to mothers 
making the transition from welfare to work. 
 
Throughout this report we discuss the current expectation built into the system. In many 
instances, we suggest that these expectations do not appear realistic and therefore tend 
not to benefit the child support system, the low-income fathers, or the mothers and 
children.   





ESTABLISHING REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS FOR LOW-INCOME FATHERS 
 
A myriad of factors affect how much child support low-income noncustodial parents are 
required to pay. This section discusses the background and basis for the determination 
of support amounts, describes the adverse effects of current child support agency 
processes, and offers recommendations to mitigate these adverse effects. 
 
Considering the “Ability to Pay” 
 
The child support reforms passed in 1996 (PRWORA) provided the U.S. with some of 
the toughest child support enforcement tools in the world. This Act included new hire 
reporting procedures, financial institution data matching, license revocation, passport 
revocation, and work requirement authority, among other measures. These provisions 
give states the ability to vigorously enforce child support obligations. Most agree it is 
appropriate to use tough tools to enforce child support obligations if the father has the 
ability to pay support and fails to do so. In the United States, society expects and 
demands that fathers support their children. However, the justification for tough 
enforcement is dependent upon establishing obligations that reflect the obligor’s “ability 
to pay.” If tough enforcement measures are directed at obligors who do not have the 
ability to pay, public support for tough enforcement declines. 
 
If a noncustodial father has a good paying job, most would agree he has the ability to pay 
support. If a noncustodial father is totally disabled, with no income or assets, most 
would agree he does not have the ability to pay. Of course, many cases fall somewhere 
between these examples. If someone is unemployed, does he have the ability to pay?  
What if the unemployment is voluntary? Should poor fathers who are subsisting below 
poverty themselves be expected to pay child support?    
  
Ultimately, defining the “ability to pay” is a decision which rests with state legislatures, as 
federal law requires all states to set standardized child support guidelines for determining 
the amount of child support orders. All child support guidelines consider the income of 
the father in determining the child support amount. Problems arise for a low-income 
father, though, when the obligation amount is not based on his actual income—and, 
thus, is not based on his ability to pay. This can occur most often when the child support 
order is set by default. Practices such as imputing income, retroactive support, and 
minimum orders also contribute to the failure to consider the ability to pay. This critical 
area of the system needs careful scrutiny and reform in order to justify tough 
enforcement policies. 
 




Establishing Child Support Orders Based Upon Guidelines 
 
Federal law requires that all states develop and use child support guidelines in 
establishing the amount of the child support order.16 Child support guidelines provide a 
numeric formula to determine the amount of the order.  These guidelines must be 
reviewed by the state every four years.17 Prior to the 1984 Child Support Amendments, 
which mandated the development of state child support guidelines, state laws for 
determining the amount of child support obligations were very general and discretionary, 
leading to wide variations in the amount of orders for parties in similar circumstances. 
The use of guidelines has resulted in more consistency—and somewhat higher 
amounts—in child support orders. 
 
One criticism of current guidelines is that they may not be sensitive enough to the 
circumstances of low-income noncustodial fathers. According to some experts, some 
child support guidelines are too regressive, requiring low-income noncustodial parents to 
pay a larger share of their income toward child support than higher-income noncustodial 
parents.18 One reason for this regressivity is that child support guidelines are based on 
the cost of raising children. These costs do not increase proportionally as income levels 
rise.  
 
All state guidelines use income as a major factor in determining the amount of the 
obligation, along with other factors, such as the number of children, medical costs, and 
child care costs. Some guidelines only consider the noncustodial parent’s income, but the 
majority of state guidelines consider both parents’ income. Most state guidelines allow a 
self-support reserve so that a certain amount of income is set aside for minimal, basic 
living expenses of the father before the child support obligation is determined. In many 
states, this self-support reserve is incorporated into the schedule so it is not obvious to 
guidelines users. The self-support reserve in most states, however, is considerably below 
the federal poverty level for one person. This is because few states periodically update 
the self-support reserve, or because they purposely set it below the poverty level. Self-
support reserves are also used in other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand.  
 





Alternative Approaches to Low-Income Adjustments 
 
Most recently, certain states (e.g., Colorado and South Dakota) have adopted 
alternative approaches to low-income adjustments in child support guidelines. 
These states first ask what the order amount would have to be so the parents 
would have the same standard of living if both parents earned minimum wage. 
Each parent’s standard of living is calculated by considering the ratio of the 
parent’s after-tax income, net of child support, to the federal poverty guidelines. 
For the father, this would be his after-tax income minus child support, as a 
proportion of the federal poverty guidelines for a single person. For the mother, 
this would be her after-tax income plus child support, as a proportion of the 
federal poverty guidelines for the mother and the children. This calculation 
provides the child support guideline amount at minimum wage income. Above 
this income threshold, there is a shift from poverty-income-determined amounts 
to guideline-determined amounts that consider how much would have spent on 
the child had the family remained intact. 
 
 
Several other provisions in the state guideline can unintentionally undermine the 
effectiveness of a low-income adjustment in a state guideline. An additional amount for 
childcare and the child’s medical expenses (i.e., the health insurance premium and any 
medical expenses not covered by health insurance) are added to base support in several 
states. In other states with a self-support reserve, the father’s share of childcare and 
medical expenses is added to the order amount after the self-support reserve test is 
applied. If these expenses are substantial, the end result will be a support order that 
leaves the father with less than a poverty-level income if he pays it. However, other 
states (e.g., Vermont and West Virginia) apply the self-support reserve test after childcare 
and medical expenses are added to base support. In these states, the integrity of the self-
support reserve test is retained. 
 
Another factor is adjustments for multiple families. A Washington State study analyzing 
cases with $500 in arrears and no payment in six months found that 46 percent of 
noncustodial parents have multiple orders.19 Many were delinquent in child support just 
because the maximum amount that could be legally withheld from their paycheck was 
not sufficient to meet the multiple current support obligations. State child support 
guidelines differ in how they deal with multiple families, and it is often a controversial 
issue. Should the child support available for a child decline because the father has 
remarried or had additional children? A small proportion of states limit the adjustment 
for additional dependents to cases where the parents had children who were born prior 
to those who are the subject of the guidelines calculation.  
 
Finally, another common provision in guidelines and procedure is to impute full-time 
earnings for noncustodial parents who work part-time or have seasonal employment 
(discussed in greater detail later). Imputing income in these circumstances can make the 




noncustodial parent ineligible for the low-income adjustment that would apply if the 
actual income were used. 
 
A central question for states is whether guidelines should be adjusted to lower the 
expectations for low-income noncustodial parents. This is a difficult and often hotly 
debated policy decision because the needs of children, often living below poverty, must 
be balanced with the ability of noncustodial parents—many of whom are poor 
themselves—to pay support. In setting guidelines, states are making a political decision 
that attempts to balance these different interests. There is no single, clear answer to this 
dilemma, but states reviewing their guidelines need to be sensitive to these issues and 
understand that it does little good to set child support awards that low-income 
noncustodial parents cannot pay. This only increases arrearages, creates resentment 
against the child support system, and puts the child support agency in the unproductive 
role of trying to collect money where none exists. The old saying “You can’t get blood 
from a turnip” is often used to describe the futility of such an approach. 
 
Just as importantly, the effect of policies relating to default orders, imputing income, 
minimum orders, and retroactive support can produce regressive effects. This results in 
low-income noncustodial parents paying more, proportionally, than higher income 
noncustodial parents. These issues may be more important to address than guideline 
amounts if a state wants to ensure that child support orders are based on a true ability to 
pay. Also, these policies may be easier to change from a political standpoint than 
changing guidelines, as they do not directly involve tradeoffs between poor noncustodial 
parents and poor children. 
 
 
Child Support Guidelines 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 States should use state guideline reviews to reexamine the financial expectation of low-
income noncustodial parents and ensure that they pay an equitable percentage of their 
income as compared to higher-income noncustodial parents. 
9 States should consider adding low-income adjustments to their guidelines—or revising 
their existing low-income adjustment—to better consider noncustodial parents’ ability 
to pay. States also should consider how the addition of child care and the child’s 
medical expenses to the base support amount would affect low-income noncustodial 
parents, and further depart from their ability to pay. 
9 States should use guidelines reviews to reassess the adjustments for multiple families, 
particularly as they apply to low-income noncustodial parents. 




9 Congress should create a National Guidelines Commission to examine and make 
recommendations on state guidelines, including: 1) levels and adequacy of support 
amounts; 2) treatment of multiple families; 3) whether more uniformity in terms and 
guideline amounts is desirable; 4) imputing income; 4) minimum orders; 5) retroactive 





Researchers and observers have cited default child support orders and as a contributing 
factor to the large amounts of child support arrearages accumulated by many low-
income obligors.20 Default orders result when the noncustodial parent fails to make a 
legal appearance in the child support case brought against him. The court or 
administrative agency then enters a default order, often imputing income to the parent, 
or sometimes setting a minimum child support order. The default order may exceed 
what a low-income father can reasonably afford to pay. Since so little is known regarding 
default order practices, we surveyed and analyzed such practices in a number of 
jurisdictions around the country. 21    
 
Default orders are a necessary part of the judicial process, and are appropriately justified 
when someone knowingly has the ability to respond to a court action and fails to do so. 
People should not be able to escape their responsibilities by ignoring or evading court 
actions. However, a myriad of problems can result in unfairly entered default orders, 
especially for low-income individuals. First, the legal papers are often served by private 
companies that get paid based on the number of papers they “serve,” and not whether 
the papers actually reach the right person. Most jurisdictions allow “substitute service,” 
where the papers are left with co-workers, relatives, or acquaintances that reside with the 
father. Process servers are not always careful about who gets the papers under substitute 
service. They may leave the papers with whoever comes to the door, even if the right 
person has moved or never lived there at all. There is little monitoring of process 
servers, so the extent of this problem is unknown. 
 
Default orders also result when the father is properly served but is unable to respond for 
some reason. Many fathers have language difficulties, may not understand the nature of 
the papers, or are fearful of getting involved with the justice system. Few low-income 
fathers can afford to hire an attorney, and few Legal Aid offices handle such cases. Other 
logistical barriers are frequent. In some jurisdictions, filing fees as high as $200 are 
required for the father to file an answer. Also, he may have to travel long distances to 
appear in person to file an answer at a designated courthouse or building.  
 
When child support orders are established by default, two concerns are raised:  
 




9 The noncustodial parent may be unaware of the obligation or the obligation amount, 
and therefore may be less likely to make child support payments.  
9 Default orders are often based upon presumed or imputed income, rather than actual 
income information, and therefore may not reflect the true ability of the 
noncustodial parent to pay child support.  
 
As a result, a potentially unproductive arrearage cycle begins: 1) an order is set by default 
for a support amount possibly greater than the obligor can afford; 2) retroactive support 
is tacked on to the initial support obligation, resulting in instant arrears (generally 
without the obligor’s knowledge); 3) the default obligor is less likely to make current 
payments than an obligor who actively participates in the order process; and 4) the 
father’s failure to make current payments cause arrearages to accrue at a rapid rate. 
 
Default Order Rates 
 
In 2002 Policy Studies Inc. conducted a survey of selected jurisdiction to obtain data on 
default order rates. As shown in Exhibit 1 below, default order rates varied significantly 
in the jurisdictions reviewed—from as low as 10 percent in Harris County, Texas, and 13 
percent in New York City—to as high as 62 percent in Maricopa County, Arizona, and 
79 percent in Los Angeles County.  
 
Exhibit 1 
Default Order Rates in Selected Jurisdictions 
 
Jurisdiction Default Order Rate22 
Harris County, Texas 10% 
New York City, New York 13% 
Hennepin County, Minnesota 19% 
Connecticut 20% 
Alaska 30% 
King County, Washington 52%* 
Maricopa County, Arizona 62% 
Los Angeles County, California 79% 
  * Administratively established orders only 
 
This illustrates the significant differences in default order rates, apparently attributable to 
widely differing default practices. The high default order rates, such as in Los Angeles 
County and Maricopa County, raise serious questions about the legitimacy of many of 
these orders. A high percentage of these orders are not based upon actual income. Also, 
high default rates may result in lower collection rates on current support.23 Exhibit 2 
below details the variation in default order practices and the resulting potential effect on 
default order rates. 
 





Default Order Practices 
 





Some jurisdictions actively promote 
communication between the 
caseworker and the NCPs. These 
jurisdictions believe it is important for 
NCPs to understand the nature and 
significance of the child support case. 
NCPs who telephone or drop-ins are 
encouraged to file a response or to 
enter a stipulation. For example, Alaska 
conducts outreach efforts to encourage 
parents to contact the agency by 
telephone or mail with questions or 
concerns. Conversely, other 
jurisdictions employ practices that 
result in almost no communication 
with NCPs.  
Increased communication between 
caseworkers and NCPs appear to result in 
more active participation by NCPs in the 
process of setting the child support award, 
better income information, and reduced 
default orders. 
 
Time and Date Certain 
for Appearance 
Some jurisdictions require a written 
answer. Other jurisdictions give NCPs 
a time and date certain to make a 
personal appearance, either for an 
appointment with a caseworker or for 
a court hearing. 
Many child support professionals believe 
that giving NCPs a time and date certain to 
appear decreases the default rate. Many 
NCPs find it difficult to answer pleadings 
and easier to make a personal appearance. 
Use of Stipulations  Some jurisdictions, such as 
Connecticut, actively encourage 
stipulations (agreements). But 
Hennepin County and New York City, 
which have relatively low default order 
rates, do not encourage stipulations; 
instead, the agency encourages NCPs 
to show up personally in court if they 
want to enter an agreement. 
It appears that both strategies, encouraging 
the use of stipulations and encouraging 
court appearances, may be effective in 
reducing default order rates. Both 
approaches result in NCPs’ active 
participation in the process.  
Internal Agency 
Incentives 
Some jurisdictions employ internal 
agency incentives with caseworkers, 
such as productivity rates (reported in 
Maricopa County) or a heavy emphasis 
on compliance with times frames 
(reported in Los Angeles County).   
Jurisdictions that impose productivity rates 
or heavily emphasize time frames create 
additional incentives for caseworkers to 
process and produce orders without NCP 
participation. 
Filing Fees Of those court processes analyzed, 
only two jurisdictions imposed NCP 
filing fees. Los Angeles County had a 
filing fee of $191. Maricopa County 
imposed a filing fee of $28. 
Filing fees charged to NCPs are an 
impediment to their entering a legal 
response, resulting in an increased 
likelihood of default orders. 




Issue State Practices Potential Effect on Default Order Rate 
Additional Notices 
Prior to Entering 
Default Orders 
Some jurisdictions require additional 
notice before a default order can be 
entered. In Maine, a letter is sent to 
NCPs. In Hennepin County, if the 
NCP has been served but does not 
appear in a paternity case, an order to 
show cause is prepared and a bench 
warrant is served. Harris County uses 
either precepts (order to appear) or 
sends an additional notice by certified 
mail (citation only cases).  
Additional notices seem likely to reduce 
default orders since NCPs may be more 
likely to appear and participate in the 
proceedings. 
Default Hearings Some jurisdictions, including Hennepin 
County, Connecticut, and Maricopa 
County, require a default hearing, while 
other jurisdictions, such as Los 
Angeles, “rubberstamp” default orders 
without a hearing, strictly on the basis 
that the NCP failed to file a written 
response. 
Hearings provide an additional opportunity 
for NCPs to appear and participate in the 
proceedings. In some jurisdictions, 
however, particularly those with crowded 
court calendars, requiring default hearings 
could delay the establishment of orders. 
Simplified Language Legal documents, such as a summons 
and complaint served on the NCP, can 
be long, complicated, and written in 
language difficult to understand. Some 
jurisdictions have taken special 
measures to have the documents 
written in less complicated language. 
For example, Maine employs a sixth 
grade reading level and Virginia 
employs a fifth grade reading level. 
 
A number of jurisdictions have 
included very explicit, simple language 
to get the attention of NCPs named in 
child support cases. For instance, 
Connecticut includes, “YOU MUST 
APPEAR” on the face of the 
documents. In Hennepin County, the 
summons and petition package has 
been simplified under uniform state 
forms with the addition of an explicit 
warning about the consequences of the 
failure to appear. 
Child support professionals in the 
jurisdictions with simplified legal 
documents and explicit language believe it 
reduces default orders.   
 




Reducing Default Orders - The Role of Agency Culture 
 
A significant difference between those jurisdictions with high default order rates and 
those with low rates appears to be due to agency culture. Agencies that actively promote 
the establishment of orders, regardless of whether the orders are obtained by default, 
have higher default order rates. Los Angeles County rapidly increased its percentage of 
cases with orders over the past five years, but perhaps by employing practices that 
increased default orders.  
 
Jurisdictions that we surveyed that try to avoid default judgments exhibit a culture—
from top to bottom—that appears significantly different. For example, child support 
officials in Alaska, Hennepin County, and New York City expressed a high degree of 
concern that the right person is served, that default orders are kept to a minimum, and 
that order amounts are realistic given the actual income of the noncustodial parent. 
Hennepin County and New York City both reported that the courts in those 
jurisdictions are reluctant to enter default orders, and their judges carefully scrutinized 
the cases and the service of process before a default order is entered.  
 
If agency culture does indeed play a significant role in contributing to default order rates, 
it suggests that child support agencies should take internal steps to change the agency 
culture, in addition to examining policies imposed by statute or court rules. Careful 
attention to messages, incentives, and other information communicated to staff may 
change the agency culture over time. Also, a critical issue for child support agencies is 
how they define their mission. Is it simply to collect as much money as possible, or is it a 








9 Child support agencies should promote an agency culture centered on obtaining “good 
orders” that include active involvement of the noncustodial parent and are based on 
accurate income information. 
9 Child support agencies should ensure that internal productivity standards do not 
contribute to high default order rates. 
9 Child support agencies should track jurisdiction default rates to assess whether there 









Communication and Accessibility  
9 Child support agencies should promote communications with noncustodial parents that 
facilitate a better understanding of the nature and significance of the child support 
matter. 
9 Child support agencies should make use of the telephone and drop-ins to obtain more 
information from noncustodial parents on their location and income. This is also an 
opportunity to educate noncustodial parents on their responsibilities. 
9 Child support agencies should re-write documents that are served to make them easily 
understandable. 
9 Child support agencies should ensure that documents are available in the language 
spoken by the noncustodial parent.  
9 Child support agencies should have interpreters readily accessible. 
9 Child support agencies should use simple cover forms and “YOU MUST 
APPEAR” language to emphasize importance of documents. 
9 Child support agencies should either encourage stipulations or encourage personal 
appearance before the adjudicatory body setting the obligation. 
9 Child support agencies should use informal responses as an opportunity to avoid 
defaults by encouraging stipulations or participation in the proceedings. 
9 Child support agencies should their offices, and if possible, courthouses, easily 
accessible. 
9 States should eliminate respondent filing fees. 
Personal Appearances 
9 Child support agencies should require appearance by giving noncustodial parents a time 
and date certain to appear for appointments or court hearings. 
9 Child support agencies should require orders to show cause and bench warrants to 
compel attendance in paternity cases. 
9 Child support agencies should require a default hearing prior to entering default orders. 
9 Child support agencies should use multiple notices to the noncustodial parent prior to 
entering default orders. 
 





Federal Performance and Incentive Measures and Default Orders  
 
Federal performance measures and incentives may have some impact on child 
support agency policies and culture in regard to establishment of orders and 
resulting default orders. 
PRWORA required the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consultation 
with directors of state child support enforcement programs, to recommend to 
Congress a new state incentive funding system based on performance. An 
Incentive Funding Work Group developed recommendations for a new 
performance-based incentive funding system. The Group recommended five key 
performance measures to evaluate each state’s performance and to measures 
results in the child support enforcement program. These measures included 
paternity establishment, support order establishment, collection of current 
support, collection of arrearages, and cost effectiveness. Incentives would be 
paid to the states based on each state’s weighted scores on each of these 
measures. These performance measures were ultimately incorporated in the 
legislation passed by Congress in 1998: the Child Support Performance and 
Incentive Act. 
A state or jurisdiction that does not perform well in establishing orders may 
initiate policies and procedures to increase the percentage of cases with orders, 
even if those procedures result in high default order rates. However, it seems 
likely that high default order rates lead to lower collection rates on current 
support obligations, another important incentive measure. Further research on 
the effects and interactions of program measures is needed. 
 
 
Service of Process 
 
Service of process practices can affect default order rates. Service of process is the 
formal delivery of documents initiating a court or administrative action, such as a child 
support case. Rules on service of process in civil matters—as child support cases are—
most often require the documents (usually called a summons and complaint or summons 
and petition) to be delivered to the person named as the “respondent” or “defendant” in 
the proceeding. These papers require that the respondent or defendant respond in 














Methods of Service of Process 
 
Service of process is governed by statutes, state court rules, and sometimes by 
local court rules. There are frequently similarities in the laws and rules involving 
the service of process among states since they are based upon model rules. 
However, there also can be considerable variation on the details. Besides statutes 
and court rules, local jurisdictions and child support offices may have their own, 
more restrictive practices. 
Many states use rule language which provides for service of process similar to 
the following: “Service… shall be effected by delivering a copy of the summons 
and of the pleading to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at 
the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion then residing therein…”24 Service of a summons, 
complaint or petition on the actual person named is broadly referred to as 
“personal service.” Service on someone other than the individual named, such as 
at the residence “with some person of suitable age and discretion” is termed 
“substitute service.” Substitute service rules vary considerably.25 In addition, 
certain jurisdictions, particularly those that use administrative processes (e.g., 
Alaska), allow service by certified mail to establish administrative orders. Maine 
and Washington allow service by mail for administrative orders but not for 
paternity cases. 
Multiple means of service on the same individual are used in some jurisdictions. 
For example, Virginia serves by first class mail as well as by the sheriff serving 
the documents. Other jurisdictions make a distinction between paternity cases 
and cases only establishing a child support obligation. Maine requires personal 
service in paternity cases but allows child support orders to be served through 
certified mail. Hennepin County procedures require personal service in paternity 
cases, but allow substitute service only in cases establishing child support 
awards. 
Most state rules of civil procedure also provide for service by publication in 
limited circumstance when the party being served cannot otherwise be located or 
is avoiding service. Under service by publication, a legal notice is published in a 
local newspaper advising the person of the legal proceeding brought against him. 
While some jurisdictions reported they used service by publication with some 
frequency in the past, none of the jurisdictions examined currently uses it other 
than in very rare instances.  
Many child support professionals have come to the conclusion that personal 
service, rather than substitute service or service by publication, is more likely to 
result in actual service to the right person, resulting in lower default order rates.  
 
 
The jurisdictions surveyed used a variety of types of process servers to deliver the 
documents—state troopers (Alaska), private process servers (Alaska, Maricopa County, 
and Adams County), Sheriff’s Office (Virginia), and state staff (Connecticut). Many 
jurisdictions used more than one method. For instance, they may use law enforcement as 




a first resort and private process servers for more difficult cases. Maine uses all three—
Child Support Enforcement staff, the Sheriff’s Department, and private process servers. 
Hennepin County uses both the Sheriff and private process severs.  
 
Payment methods for service of process also varied among jurisdictions. Some 
jurisdictions pay for service by the number of attempts required, others pay for only 
successful service, and some pay additional fees based upon mileage. It is possible that 
payment methods influence the quality of service. While there are no hard data to 
confirm this, private process servers paid on “successful service” may have an incentive 
to use substitute service, and may not use due care as to who receives the actual 
documents.  
 
Service of process rates varied little among jurisdictions that were able to provide this 
information. Alaska reported a 70 percent success rate, Maricopa County reported 65 
percent, and New York City reported 65 percent. Adams County, Colorado, reported a 
success rate of 89 percent and 54 percent for one month which was tracked depending 
on which of two private process servers was used. One Colorado study comparing an in-
house process server with a private contractor found “there was little difference in the 
success rate achieved by the private vendor and the in-house process server. During the 
study period, 56 percent of the documents issued to the contract workers were 
successfully served while the in-house technician achieved a 53 percent rate of success.”26  
 
The rate of successful service will impact the number of cases that remain in locate 
status without a child support order. As a consequence, a number of jurisdictions have 
taken special measures to improve the locate information given to process servers to 
increase the rate of successful service. In Alaska, individual caseworkers communicate 
directly with process servers. Alaska also recently contracted with a private company to 
provide additional location information in difficult cases. In Harris County, child support 
locate troubleshooters co-locate with constables performing the service. In Maricopa 
County, an Office of Special Investigations conducts intensive locate research using 
many state information databases, including law enforcement databases. In Maine and 
Virginia, caseworkers telephone noncustodial parents directly to get current locate 
information if they cannot otherwise be served.  
 





Service of Process 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 For paternity cases, child support agencies should require personal service and not 
substitute service. 
9 Child support agencies should use multiple means of service, such as service by first-
class mail in addition to personal service. 
9 Child support agencies should carefully monitor the actions of process servers to ensure 
proper service of process.  
9 Child support agencies should use the telephone to call custodial parents, noncustodial 
parents and employers for locate information prior to making service attempts. 
9 Child support agencies should use all automated locate sources available. 
9 Child support agencies should encourage direct communication between caseworkers 
and process servers. 
9 Child support agencies should use special staff or private contractors to provide 





Most states impute income when the noncustodial parent is unemployed or income is 
unknown. Income is deemed unknown if the noncustodial parent fails to appear in court 
and is held in default, and the court or tribunal has no information on which to base the 
order. The rationale for imputing income when income is unknown is that the court or 
administrative unit setting support must use some method of income determination, 
otherwise the noncustodial parent would benefit from his or her failure to provide 
information or appear at the hearing. The rational for imputing income when the 
noncustodial parent is unemployed is based on the assumption that noncustodial parents 
can and should find employment in order to support their children. In addition, in some 
cases, the noncustodial parent may claim he is unemployed, but he actually has income 
from work in the underground economy or from some other undisclosed source. 
(Recent research suggests that a significant share of unmarried fathers—three in ten—
participate in some underground work activity.27) Imputing income ensures that 
noncustodial parents do not escape their obligations because their income is hidden.  
 
An Office of Inspector General (OIG) study found that most of the sampled states (nine 
of ten) imputed income if no income information was available, and half of the sampled 
states imputed if the noncustodial parent was unemployed.28 Most sampled states also 
imputed income if the parent was deemed underemployed. The OIG report further 
found that income was imputed in 45 percent of the cases it analyzed. In 37 percent of 
imputed income cases studied by the OIG, the noncustodial parent was unemployed or 




underemployed. In 46 percent of imputed income cases, the noncustodial parent failed 
to appear at the case conference or court hearing, or he failed to provide income 
information. In their absence, default orders were set using imputed income. The OIG 
report also found that child support was less likely to be paid in cases where income was 
imputed (although a causal relationship could not be assumed). 
 
Imputing income is often used when setting child support award amounts for low-
income noncustodial parents because they frequently fail to appear or provide adequate 
documentation of income. Like minimum and retroactive orders, imputing income often 
results in excessive arrearages that the noncustodial parent often cannot pay. 
 
The court setting the child support award commonly imputes income based on the 
assumption that the noncustodial parent is earning the equivalent of a full time job at 
minimum wage. The OIG reported that 35 states based imputed income “on the premise 
that the noncustodial parent should be able to work a minimum wage job for 40 hours 
per week.”29 Other states assume income at some other standard, such as the standard of 
need for the family. For example, in the absence of other income information, California 
law provides that income is presumed to be an amount equal to the Minimum Basic 
Standard of Adequate Care (MBSAC) for the supported child. In 2002 the presumed 
income for an obligor with one child to be supported was $2,145 per month under the 
MBSAC. The related child support order for that income level was $423 per month.   
 
 
Iowa’s IV-D Median Wage Approach 
 
Based upon a legislatively-mandated study, the child support agency in Iowa 
determined that the state median household income level, which was used when 
income was imputed, was too high to be representative of the income of 
noncustodial parents involved in the child support program. The child support 
caseload typically had lower incomes than the state as a whole. Therefore, basing 
orders on the median household income resulted in significantly higher order 
amounts than orders based on actual income. The median household, income-
based orders also had a lower payment rate (8 percent), compared to those based 
on actual earning information (52 percent). In response, the state agency created 
the Child Support Recovery Unit (CSRU) Median Wage Rate based upon the 
median wage of the child support population. This resulted in significantly lower 
order amounts when imputing income for low-income noncustodial parents. 
 
 
There are a number of alternatives to imputing income which vary depending upon the 
reason income has been imputed. If the noncustodial parent is unemployed, and as a 
result, the state imputes income at the level of a minimum wage job, imputing income is 
essentially setting a minimum order. In this situation, states could impute income only in 
cases where the noncustodial parent has the genuine ability to pay support (i.e., impute if 




voluntarily unemployed and do not impute if involuntarily laid-off). States could also 
consider reducing the level at which they impute income. The California standard, for 
example, seems excessively high when applied to low-income obligors. (See Iowa’s 
alternative approach described in the box above.) 
 
As an alternative to imputing income when income information is unknown, states could 
reserve the order or set zero orders until a future date when actual income information is 
obtained.  
 
States can also make better use of automated data sources to obtain actual income 
information. This would reduce the number of cases where income is imputed. 
Automated data sources include the State Employment Security Agency (SESA), state 
new hire reporting, state personal income tax returns, the Expanded Federal Parent 






9 Child support agencies should limit imputing income—both as to the amount and the 
circumstances under which it will impute income (i.e., voluntary unemployment or 
voluntary underemployment). 
9 Child support agencies should limit imputing income by reserving orders or setting zero 
orders in cases where no income information is obtained and review the case after 30, 
60, or 90 days. 






Many states also set minimum child support orders. Minimum orders set obligations at 
some minimum dollar amount, whether or not the father is employed or has income. 
Typically, minimum monthly orders are set at $50 to $100.30   
 
States establish minimum orders under the expectation that all parents, regardless of 
income, should make some financial contribution to their child. Many policymakers feel 
that all noncustodial parents have a moral obligation to support their children. 
Additionally, many policymakers believe that all noncustodial parents can find some 
work in the economy if they really want to, and thus have the ability to contribute 
financial support. However, researchers and policymakers have recently questioned 
whether this policy makes sense in the long-term. Establishing minimum orders may lead 
to the build-up of excessive arrearages that noncustodial parents cannot pay, particularly 




if they are unemployed or underemployed. Not unexpectedly, a recent OIG study found 
that minimum orders exhibited a lower payment rate than non-minimum orders.31 
 
Minimum orders are also often used for incarcerated noncustodial parents under the 
theory that incarceration is the consequence of the noncustodial parent’s behavior, and 
hence a form of voluntary unemployment. However, this policy may do nothing to 
benefit children, and may make it more difficult for ex-offenders to meet their child 
support obligations when they are released. 
 
For many policy makers, minimum orders in the range of $50 or $100 per month do not 
seem unrealistic, and even small amounts of child support can make an important 
difference for children. However, states could be more selective about when they impose 
minimum orders. For instance, states could impose minimum orders when the father can 
financially support the child (i.e., fully capable of work) and not impose minimum orders 
when the father cannot provide support (i.e., incarcerated or disabled). Both Australia 
and New Zealand have minimum orders (limited to $260 per year in Australia and $663 
per year in New Zealand), but are much more selective about the circumstances in which 
they are imposed. 
 
States should also ensure they comply with the federal law requiring that the use of 
minimum orders be rebutable when their application would be unjust or inappropriate in 
a particular case.32 
 
Finally, minimum orders could be tied to amounts that actually benefit the child, rather 
than the state. For example, if the state employs a pass-through of child support 
payments to the mother—and then disregards regards that child support income when 
determining her eligibility for certain benefits—it may be appropriate to limit minimum 
order amounts to no more than the amount allowed to be passed through and 
disregarded to the family under state welfare rules. This would ensure that minimum 
orders benefit the children for whom the support is intended. (See the discussion on 






9 States should limit minimum orders to cases where the noncustodial parent has the 
realistic capability of making a current financial contribution. 
9 States should consider limiting the amount of minimum orders to no more than the 
amount passed-through and disregarded for welfare purposes. 
 
 




Retroactive or Back Support 
 
Most states set retroactive or back support when setting the initial child support order, 
requiring payment of child support from the child’s date of birth or some other defined 
period (i.e., from the date of filing of the legal action, or a specific number of years). 
Fees and costs can also be included in the initial order. These fees and costs may include 
Medicaid child birth costs, paternity testing costs, attorney’s services, court fees, and 
ongoing case processing fees. According to a recent OIG survey of state practices, 46 
states charge retroactive support, assess debt, or do both.33  The amounts assessed can 
be in the thousands of dollars. Medicaid birthing costs, in particular, can be as high as 
$2,000 to $4,000. 
 
Imposing retroactive support and fees causes the noncustodial parent to start off with 
arrears. Critics contend this is a nonproductive policy as it contributes to the build-up of 
excessive arrears that the noncustodial parent may never be able to pay. On the other 
hand, defenders argue that a father’s responsibility for the child begins at birth, and that 
retroactive support prevents noncustodial parents from benefiting from child support 
evasion. States have also required the payment of retroactive support as a way to 
maximize reimbursement for public assistance costs. 
 
The subject of retroactive support and fees is an area where balance is needed in public 
policy. First, states should generally limit the time period of retroactivity. It makes little 
sense to go back several years prior to the date of filing as some states do. Moreover, 
there are a number of additional options for policymakers. One possibility is that states 
could adopt policies that limit retroactive support to the date of filing except where the 
father has attempted to evade legal authorities. For instance, the judge or tribunal could 
have discretionary authority to set retroactive support only when someone has attempted 
to evade service of process. States could also cap the total amount of “add-ons” 






9 States should limit retroactive support by limiting the time period of retroactivity or 
restricting retroactive support only to cases when the noncustodial parent has attempted 
to evade legal authorities. 
9 Child support agencies should reduce, eliminate or cap front-end fees and add-on costs 
charged to low-income noncustodial parents. 
9 Congress should amend the Social Security Act to preclude State IV-D agencies from 
attempting to recover Medicaid birthing costs.  
 





PROMOTING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 
 
Millions of noncustodial parents voluntarily comply with their child support obligations 
and pay support in full without any coercive enforcement action. More noncustodial 
parents would voluntarily comply with their support obligations if child support 
programs focused on promoting voluntary compliance.34  Unfortunately, programs often 
allow arrears to build up before taking action and then the father’s first contact with the 
child support agency is a negative one as their bank account is frozen or their driver’s 
license is suspended. This creates an antagonistic relationship from the outset. This is 
particularly true for low-income noncustodial parents who are not likely to be well 
informed about child support system procedures. 
 
Other public policies also discourage voluntary compliance by low-income noncustodial 
parents. With pass-through and disregard rules, noncustodial parents often see their child 
support payments going to the state, rather than to the child. This may discourage 
payment or encourage payment through informal means. 
 
Additionally, child support agencies focus on child support collection rather than 
increasing the capacity of noncustodial parents, particularly low-income fathers, to pay 
support. Yet, many young unwed fathers have difficulty supporting themselves, let alone 
supporting a child. Many advocates and policymakers believe that these low-income 
fathers need a broad range of employment and family services. While child support 
agencies cannot provide all the necessary services directly, they can act as a partner and 
source of referrals for these services. 
 
Federal and state legislatures and child support agencies should rethink their approach to 
child support enforcement with greater promotion of voluntary compliance. Promoting 
voluntary compliance would increase the payment rate for current support obligations, 
thus benefiting poor mothers and children. Voluntary compliance would also reduce 
antagonism in the relationship between parents and the child support agency. 
 
Passing-Through Child Support to Families on Welfare 
 
Current welfare rules require that when someone goes on welfare (TANF), they assign 
their right to child support payments to the state and cooperate with child support 
enforcement efforts. This is to help reimburse the state for the assistance provided to the 
family. Therefore, instead of benefiting the custodial parent and children, child support 
payments are paid to the state. Some states “pass-through” some part of the child 
support (usually $50) to the welfare recipient and “disregard” it for purposes of 
determining the level of benefit payment. Prior to the 1996 welfare reform law, a $50 
pass-through was required, and the federal government shared in the cost. However, the 




1996 welfare reform law gave states much more flexibility and eliminated the $50 pass-
through requirement. A minority of states have chosen to keep a pass-through and 
disregard, but states that do so must now bear the entire cost. 
 
As a result of this assignment requirement, child support paid by low-income 
noncustodial parents often does not benefit their children. It is easy to understand that 
this approach does not encourage voluntary compliance with child support obligations. 
Poor noncustodial parents want to know that the support payments they are making are 
actually benefiting their children. When child support payments do not reach the 
children for whom they are intended, this may encourage payments informally—either 
under the table or through non-cash contributions. This practice is problematic because 
it could constitute welfare fraud for the custodial parents. Also, arrears continue to build 
up for the noncustodial parents, as no credit is given for informal payments. 
 
States should consider passing-through and disregarding more of the child support to 
custodial parents on welfare. This would encourage voluntary compliance with child 
support obligations, and benefit families who actually receive the child support. Under a 
welfare waiver, the State of Wisconsin passes-through and disregards all child support to 
families on welfare. A recent evaluation of this approach offered encouraging findings. 
Families receiving the full pass-through and disregard were more likely to establish 
paternity, pay child support, and pay support in higher amounts.35 
 
Some policymakers have expressed concern that pass-through and disregard of child 
support to custodial parents on welfare could encourage welfare dependency since it 
could act as a disincentive to leave welfare for work.  However, the fact that welfare is 
now time limited for most recipients should significantly mitigate this concern.  
 
PRWORA also requires that families who leave welfare are first in line to receive past-
due child support (ahead of amounts assigned to the state as a condition to receive 
welfare). However, this “family first” distribution requirement has one major exception: 
money collected from the tax refund offset program continues to be distributed first to 
the state. Congress should consider repealing this exception in order to increase support 
to families who have left welfare, and to encourage payments by noncustodial parents.  
(While some states may object to the loss of revenue, this change would promote the 
overall goals of PRWORA.)   
 
Some commentators also have urged the creation of economic incentives to encourage 
low-income fathers to pay support.36  This approach would include providing matching 
payments or subsidies to children when child support payments are made on their behalf 
by low-income noncustodial parents—along with disregards of child support collections 
for mothers on welfare. Other proposals include using the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) to supplement the income of noncustodial parents who pay child support. Such 
approaches may be complicated to administer, but if successfully implemented, may 




provide additional incentives to for parents to pay child support, resulting in increased 
voluntary compliance. These approaches are worthy of testing and evaluating to 






9 Congress should change the child support funding system to provide incentives for states 
to pass-through and disregard child support to families on welfare.  
9 States should increase the amount of pass-through and disregard that welfare families 
can receive.  
9 Congress should repeal the tax refund offset exception to “family first” distribution. 




Improving Customer Service and Information Efforts  
 
Improving customer service and information efforts targeted at low-income 
noncustodial parents are other strategies to increase voluntary compliance. Improved 
customer service may lead to increased information sharing, improved relationships with 
the agency, and increased trust. The task of improving customer service in child support 
agencies requires a broad-based approach, including: 
 
9 A commitment from the state and local child support agency;   
9 Making customer service a priority in the mission and vision of the program; 
9 Developing an organizational structure that is customer service focused; 
9 Establishing policies and procedures that support customer service; and 
9 Continually monitoring customer service satisfaction.  
 
Informational efforts are equally important. If noncustodial parents understand how the 
child support program works and the importance of child support to their child, they 
may be more likely to meet their child support obligations. Many low-income 
noncustodial parents have minimal education and literacy levels, or may not be proficient 
in English. Additional efforts to educate low-income noncustodial parents, particularly at 
the outset of the case, may reap substantial benefits in the long term. 
 
Australia and New Zealand both make customer service a high priority within their 
agencies. Each carefully tracks “client satisfaction” of both custodial and noncustodial 
parents, identifies barriers to compliance, and makes constant efforts to improve the 
relations. 






Customer Relations Highlights in Australia and New Zealand 
 
Australia 
9 Caseworkers conduct up-front telephone interview with both parents. 
9 Information kits are sent to both parents at the outset. 
9 If client says they won’t pay, caseworkers are instructed to determine why.  
9 Caseworkers can offer mediation and make referrals to community services.  
9 Telephone communication is preferred and considered more personal than 
letters.  
9 Caseworkers make courtesy calls 10 days prior to the due date of the first 
payment. 
9 Child Support Client’s Charter provides, “Our role is to help separated 
parents meet their child support responsibilities.” 
9 Caseworkers receive “relationship training” to better understand and deal 
with the client’s emotional feelings. 
9 At first point of contact the aim is to, 1) ensure parents fully understand the 
child support scheme and their respective responsibilities within the scheme; 
and 2) improve collection by supporting parents to sustain child support 
arrangements with appropriate advice, information and products, and/or 
referral to external service providers. 
 
New Zealand 
9 Child support program utilizes community liaison officers. 
9 Child support caseworkers are encouraged to use a “soft glove” approach in 
dealing with clients at the beginning of a case. 
9 “Sales teams” are used to establish a relationship with customers who are 
new to Child Support. Sales staffs focus on ensuring that customers 
understand the child support process, how child support is calculated, and 
the importance of paying their child support (voluntary compliance). 
9 If the liable parent misses a payment, the Sales team contacts the customer 














Customer Relations and Information Efforts 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 Child support agencies should make customer service a high priority and they should 
develop an organizational structure and policies and procedures supportive of this 
mission. 
9 Child support agencies should ensure that staff are trained and encouraged to treat low-
income noncustodial parents in a customer-friendly manner.  
9 Child support agencies should make special educational and informational efforts to 





In the history of a child support case, the most important payments are the very first 
ones paid after an order is entered. Many child support administrators now believe that if 
those initial payments are made, there is a much greater likelihood that regular payments 
will be made in the future. In addition, if the noncustodial parents can make the 
payments from the outset, they can avoid the build-up of arrearages. Early intervention 
is the practice of monitoring payments from the outset of the order, and taking steps 
immediately if a payment is missed. This includes contacting the obligor, determining the 
reason for non-payment, and taking the appropriate steps to collect. 
 
The child support systems in Australia and New Zealand focus heavily on compliance in 
the first few months after the order is entered. As discussed below (see box), cases are 
handled by special teams at the beginning (the first nine months in Australia, and the 
first ninety days in New Zealand). Australian caseworkers are instructed that if the first 
payment is missed, “it is vitally important that contact is made with these payers as soon 
as possible after the due date.” Caseworkers are instructed to make telephone calls 
within ten days after a payment is missed, and to approach the client “sensitively and 
establish the reason for non-payment.”  
 
The child support system in the United States is far too focused on collection of 
arrearages (past due) support, rather than on early intervention efforts that would 
increase voluntary compliance with current support obligations. In many jurisdictions in 
the U.S., there is no routine caseworker contact with the noncustodial parent after the 
order is entered. If no payment is made, arrearages simply build up until automated 
enforcement action commences—up to six months later in some jurisdictions. Then, the 
noncustodial parent is faced with attachments of bank accounts, license revocations, 
liens, and other enforcement actions. If states monitored payments and encouraged 
voluntary compliance from the beginning, such enforcement actions may never be 
necessary.  





Early intervention efforts should include automated system ticklers to notify caseworkers 
when payments are missed, caseworker telephone contact with noncustodial parents, and 
segregation of cases that need early attention from other enforcement cases. 
 
 
Early Inter ention v
Recommended Practices 
 
9 Child support agencies should design procedures to monitor cases from the time the first 
payment is due and take early intervention action as soon as payments are missed.  
9 Child support agencies should use automatic ticklers to notify caseworkers when 
payments are missed. 
 
 
Case Sorting and Case Management 
 
The ability to do mass case processing—the handling of cases in volume using 
technology—was one of the major goals of PRWORA.37 This was a necessary and 
important direction in child support enforcement in order to handle the sheer number of 
cases. For child support caseworkers, caseloads for of 500 - 1000 cases were, and 
continue to be, a reality of the program. Automated processes are necessary to handle 
this volume. However, a key concept of PRWORA reforms was that mass case 
processing is intended for routine cases. It does not mean that case management 
capabilities need to be lost for hard-to-serve families. Non-routine cases, including 
dealing with low-income fathers, can be handled outside the normal mass-case 
processing procedures.  
 
Case sorting is the separation and treatment of cases based on selected criteria. It allows 
child support agencies to target enforcement techniques and services more effectively 
toward different types of noncustodial parents.  Few states currently perform case 
sorting to any significant extent, but the issue is receiving more attention. Some foreign 
countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, use this strategy successfully. For 
instance, cases could be sorted so new support orders receive special services or 
monitoring. 






Case Sorting and Case Management in Australia and New Zealand 
 
Australia and New Zealand have been extremely successful in applying case 
sorting procedures, employing special teams to deal with their child support 
caseloads, and encouraging voluntary compliance (Australia’s collection rate is 
86 percent; New Zealand’s is 88 percent). 
 
Australia 
Australia’s Child Support Agency (CSA) is divided into 3 client streams, each 
with a particular role “in meeting client needs.”  The three client streams are: 
new clients, collections support, and debt management services. 
● New Clients Stream – helps newly-separated parents organize their child 
support arrangements. Caseworkers conduct pre-registration interviews to 
explain the program and explain the different products and services available, 
such as mediation, community support groups, and legal services. A new client 
staff member is assigned to manage the case for the first nine months. 
● Collections Support Stream – provides support if an order is more than 
nine months old. Caseworker tasks in this stream include updating client details, 
care arrangements and income details; garnishing wages; and attending to client 
inquires. The collections support stream also includes a change of assessment 
team (review and adjustment). 
● Debt Management Services Stream – manages child support cases with a 
debt over $5,000. Caseworker tasks in this stream include negotiating payment 




In New Zealand, a Customer Relations Management (CRM) Model separates 
customer services into three groups: 
● Sales – establishes an initial relationship with customers who are new to child 
support, and maintain this relationship for 90 days. During the Sales stage, 
customers are educated about their rights and obligations in an effort to 
encourage voluntary compliance; payments are established; and customers are 
identified as voluntary compliers or potential non-compliers. If the liable parent 
is a voluntary complier and makes timely payments in full, they are transferred to 
the Services team after 90 days. Non-compliers are transferred to the Special 
Customer Services and Collections team. 
● Services – maintains the ongoing relationship for customers, including 
general inquiries, changes of circumstances and review of payments. 
● Special Customer Services and Collections – provides specialist services to 
specific customers to assist with administrative review and enforce compliance. 
 
 




Another related strategy is to develop caseload stratifications and collection strategies 
consistent with noncustodial parent typologies. For example, Australia assesses 
relationship and parent compliance characteristics for each case, and then uses this 
assessment to determine if the case needs individualized case management services. First, 
caseworkers look at the following indicators to determine whether the case 
characteristics are supportive of compliance: 
 
Exhibit 3 
Australia Case Assessment, Step 1 
 
Relationship Indicators Compliance (Parent Indicators)  
What is the extent of contact with the children? Does payor earn a salary or wage? 
Have the parents cooperated? Has he filed and is current on taxes? 
Have parents been married? What is his income level? 
Have parents lived together? What is his consistency of employment? 
What is the length of the relationship? What are the current contact details? 
What is the age of the youngest child? If previous cases, is he current? 
 
Based on this assessment, caseworkers place each case on one of four quadrants as 
shown below: 
Exhibit 4 


























Australia Case Assessment, Step 3 
 
Quadrant Type of Management Types of Services 
Quadrant 1 Issue management Monitor payments only 
Quadrant 2 Case management Make external referrals, monitor payments, 
encourage compliance 
Quadrant 3 Case management Early enforcement, internal and external referral 
Quadrant 4 Case management Monitor payments, early enforcement, referral to 
financial support providers 
 
Caseworkers have a community service directory quickly accessible on their computers 
which lists potential service providers appropriate for a particular case. For example, if a 
case is in Quadrant 3 and the parents have relationship problems, they may be referred 
to counseling, mediation or parenting classes with service providers in the area where the 
parents live. 
 
Providing intensive case management services to selected groups of cases is a potential 
strategy that could be implemented in the U.S., particularly for low-income noncustodial 
parents. Referral to special programs for low-income fathers can be part of the case 
management effort, including referrals to employment and training programs, public 
health programs, responsible fatherhood programs, domestic violence programs, and 
marriage and relationship skills training. 
 
Some states are just beginning to try these case management approaches. For example, in 
March 2000, the State of Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement conducted a 
pilot in the Fredericksburg District Office using a case management model that focused 
on court-ordered noncustodial parent referrals.38 The goal of the pilot was to increase the 
regularity of payments by noncustodial parents with a history of irregular payments or 
non-payment. The parents in the pilot received an assessment and case management 
services. Parents participating in the pilot increased payment rates significantly. 
 
 
Case Sorting and Case Management 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 Child support agencies should consider case sorting as a means to provide client services 
tailored to the status of the case. 
9 Child support agencies should provide more intensive case management services to low-
income fathers. 
 




Special Programs for Low-Income Fathers 
 
While child support agencies cannot provide all the services low-income fathers need to 
improve their ability to provide financial and emotional support for their children, 
opportunities exist for agencies to act as a partner and source of referrals for services. 
States, localities, and community-based organizations across the country have begun to 
increase the number of programs targeting low-income fathers. These include programs 
offering a broad array of services—employment services, job training, substance abuse 
treatment, mediation and family counseling, and parenting education. Child support 
agencies in some states are beginning to partner with community-based organizations, 
job service groups, and other faith-based and non-profit agencies. Community-based 
organizations, in particular, can engender a higher level of trust with noncustodial 
parents than government agencies. 
 
One obstacle to involvement in programs such as job training and educational programs 
is that arrears may continue to accumulate while the father is participating. Some 
programs will work with the child support system to suspend payments as long as the 
father participates in responsible fatherhood programs, training or educational activities. 
 
States have a multitude of financial resources available to fund programs for low-income 
fathers.39 These include using the TANF block grant and state maintenance of effort 
(MOE) dollars. TANF and MOE dollars can be used for a wide variety of programs for 
low-income fathers as long as the programs meet the broad purposes of TANF 
legislation. Potential services include: employment assistance; job placement; job training; 
substance abuse treatment; mentoring; counseling; abstinence and pregnancy prevention; 
mediation; and transportation and child care. States can also use Welfare-to-Work and 
other Department of Labor grants, Access and Visitation grants, and Social Services 
block grants to fund noncustodial father services. 
 
Despite this array of funding sources, efforts to provide such resources to fathers often 
compete with other program priorities for low-income families. As a consequence, many 
commentators have called for additional federal and state funding (such as a block grant) 
so that the same range of employment and family services available to poor mothers can 
be offered to poor fathers.40  
 
One difficulty states have is the uncertainty regarding what types of programs to fund. 
As yet, there is not conclusive evidence as to what mix of employment and family 
services would successfully increase the incomes of low-income fathers. Although many 
local, community-based programs report success, few have been systematically evaluated. 
The Parents’ Fair Share demonstration and other programs specifically directed at 
increasing employment and earnings of young men, have illuminated the formidable 
challenge faced by poor men struggling in a low-wage labor market. Nonetheless, there is 
hope that the right mix of services can make a difference. Additional funding, 




demonstrations, and evaluations of this effort are worthwhile, given the potential benefit 
to children. In addition, this effort could also include programs directed at promoting 
healthy marriages, including education and dissemination of information on the 
importance of marriage, developing marriage preparation courses, and assisting 
fatherhood and youth development programs in focusing on marriage. 
 
 
Lessons From Parents’ Fair Share 
 
Parents’ Fair Share (PFS) was a comprehensive demonstration project (with 
Casey Foundation support) targeted at low-income fathers in the child support 
system with the goals of increasing their ability to obtain well-paying jobs, 
increasing child support payments, and increasing their involvement in 
parenting. PFS had some positive results, but was not as successful as it was 
hoped to be. The PFS program produced no increase in employment and 
earnings; nor did it, on average, lead to any increase in the amount of contact 
fathers had with their children. One potentially promising result, however, was 
small positive increases in child support payments.  
PFS was rigorously evaluated by the Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation (MDRC). A number of lessons learned can be applied in designing 
other approaches.41 The final MDRC report on PFS concluded that the child 
support enforcement agency can play a valuable role in serving as a partner and 
source of referrals for fatherhood program: “First, the agency can influence 
recruitment and participation in the program… Second, it is important to have 
the child support agency strongly involved, so that staff can track fathers’ 
participation and employment, modify support orders, and enforce payment… 
Third, the child support agency’s involvement as a partner might facilitate the 
shift toward a focus that is more responsive to father’s circumstances.”   
 






Special Programs for Low-Income Fathers 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 Child support agencies should regularly offer referrals to programs for employment 
services, job training, substance abuse treatment, mediation and family counseling, and 
parenting education.  
9 Child support agencies should develop relationships with community-based 
organizations in order to provide referrals for services to fathers. 
9 Child support agencies should consider suspending payments while fathers are 
participating in responsible fatherhood programs, training or educational activities. 
9 Congress should fund demonstration programs providing services to noncustodial 
parents with the goal of increasing financial and emotional support to children. 
9 States should use available federal and state funds for demonstration programs to 
provide services to noncustodial parents with the goal of increasing financial and 
emotional support to children. 
 





RESPONDING TO THE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOW-INCOME PARENTS 
 
The child support system should be flexible enough to respond to the changing 
circumstances of low-income parents. As discussed above, child support orders should 
be based upon the ability of the low-income noncustodial parent to pay support. There 
are two situations when this is especially important to low-income noncustodial parents: 
 
9 Child support orders for low-income obligors are often established through default 
processes without the father’s participation and involvement. Default orders are 
often based on imputed income. Subsequently, the agency may receive actual income 
information or the father may appear in response to an enforcement action. At that 
point, the system should be responsive and allow for remedial measures, permitting 
the order to be changed to reflect the father’s ability to pay child support. 
 
9 Low-income noncustodial parents are usually employed in the low-wage labor 
market, which is more volatile and where jobs are often temporary. Thus, even if a 
low-income noncustodial parent has a job today, he could be laid off tomorrow. The 
child support system needs to be flexible enough to deal with these changes.  
 
When child support orders do not reflect the current ability of the noncustodial parent 
to pay support, this contributes to the build-up of excessive arrearages. In turn, this 
creates resentment against the child support system, discourages voluntary compliance, 
and possibly drives noncustodial parents into the underground economy. 
 
Remedial Measures for Orders 
 
A major concern expressed by researchers and observers is that high-default order rates 
contribute to the accumulation of excessive arrears. However, default orders are less 
likely to lead to excessive arrears if the jurisdiction provides a remedial measure to readily 
change the order when the noncustodial parent appears or provides new income 
information. Such subsequent appearances are a common occurrence. After a default 
order is entered, enforcement action usually commences (such as a wage garnishment or 
license revocation). This often prompts the noncustodial parent to request the 
adjudicatory body to reduce the child support obligation amount. 
 
Jurisdictions surveyed varied in their approaches to such remedial measures. In Maricopa 
County, for instance, relief is only obtained by bringing a motion to modify the original 
order. This is a legal action that can be complicated, and it requires a motion before the 
court. In other jurisdictions, such as New York City, noncustodial parents are given 30 
days from entry of the order to object, and the order can be changed. In Alaska, the 
administrative order can be set aside if new income information is provided by the 




noncustodial parent, or he can appeal through the administrative process. An obligor 
whose order is set by default is sent a package and encouraged to apply for relief from 
the original order if it was set too high. Default orders in Connecticut are considered 
provisional for four months. If the noncustodial parent can show that the order amount 
is too high based on actual income information, the order can be vacated. In King 
County, there are two remedial measures available for noncustodial parents: 1) in 
paternity cases which use a judicial process, a Conference Board can write-off or 
compromise arrearages; 2) in administrative cases (establishing child support orders 
when paternity is not an issue), the order can be administratively changed within a one-
year period. 
 
Highly administrative programs, as opposed to highly judicial programs, may have some 
attributes contributing to increased default order rates, such as service by mail (rather 
than personal service) and a lack of court hearings. However, a mitigating factor in 
administrative systems may be the ease of obtaining remedial relief to adjust the order so 
excessive arrears do not accumulate. 
 
 
Remedial Measures for Orders 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 Child support agencies should consider making default orders provisional or temporary 
to permit changes if the noncustodial parent appears and provides actual income 
information.  
9 Alternatively, child support agencies should consider allowing vacating or default 




Review and Adjustment 
 
Review and adjustment (also called review and modification) is the process of reviewing 
child support guideline factors—such as income—at a new point in time, and applying 
the state’s child support guidelines to re-determine the appropriateness of the child 
support award. There are two typical circumstances when this process could be used to 
adjust the child support order to reflect the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay: 
 
9 In some cases, an initial default order may be set too high when the noncustodial 
parent fails to make a legal appearance. As discussed above, when default orders are 
entered, they are often based upon imputed income, and are not adjusted when 
actual current income information becomes available. 
 




9 In other cases, the noncustodial parent has experienced a decrease in income since 
the order was entered, often due to a change in employment status, but the order is 
not reviewed and adjusted to reflect this decline in income.  
 
Child support orders for low-income noncustodial parents frequently are not subject to 
review and adjustment for a variety of reasons. Often, these parents are unaware of their 
right to have a review and adjustment of the order amount as circumstances change. In 
other instances, slow, cumbersome, and costly review and adjustment processes can 
discourage noncustodial parents from pursuing downward adjustments. In addition, 
some IV-D offices are reluctant to process adjustments that would lower the amount of 
the child support obligation. 
 





Rules Governing Review and Adjustment and Thresholds 
 
Prior to the enactment of PRWORA, federal law required that all AFDC cases 
be reviewed and, if justified, modified every three years. PRWORA granted 
more flexibility to states, allowing the choice of one of three options in making 
child support review and adjustments. States can continue to review and adjust 
awards based on the guidelines (as under pre-PRWORA), make a cost-of-living 
adjustment (COLA)42, or conduct an automated review process. If either of the 
latter two options is chosen by a state, the state must provide notice and 
opportunity to allow the parties to contest the adjustment and have the review 
made against the guidelines. Review and adjustments under these three options 
are only required at the request of the parties. If a party is on welfare (TANF or 
Medicaid), the request for a review can also be made at the request of the child 
support agency. States must give notice to parents every three years of the right 
to request a review. 
If it has been greater than three years since the last review, federal law provides 
that adjustments do not require a proof of a change in circumstances. If it has 
been less than three years since the order was last reviewed, IV-D agencies may 
place limits on the frequency of reviews or impose monetary thresholds before 
proceeding with the requested reviews or adjustments. Most states do limit 
reviews and require proof of a “substantial change in circumstances,” (i.e., an 
increase or decrease in the obligor’s or obligee’s income if it has been less than 
three years since the last review). State percentage thresholds for these 
limitations range from 10 percent to 25 percent, and dollar thresholds range 
from a $10 to $100 monthly change in the order.43 
Policy concerns are raised by the requirement that parents meet thresholds to 
qualify for an adjustment of the child order amount. High thresholds may 
prevent some noncustodial parents from receiving award decreases which, 
although incremental, could encourage compliance with child support payment 
obligations. Many states maintain pre-PRWORA thresholds for all child support 
modifications, even though the Act prohibits this for cases where there has been 









Office of Inspector General Report on Review and Adjustment 
 
In 1999, OIG issued a report on “Review and Adjustment of Support Orders.”44 
The purpose of the OIG report was to examine the states’ methods of reviewing 
and adjusting child support orders since welfare reform. They reported, 
“Although all states can request review of a support order, some states vary their 
treatment of cases based on which parent made the request for review or if the 
adjustment will be a decrease, rather than an increase.” Seventeen states 
proceeded with the adjustment process differently if a parent-requested review 
indicated that a decrease in the award was appropriate. The OIG also found that 
some local IV-D offices, acting independently of official state policy, did not 
conduct reviews for noncustodial parents. This report highlights the need for 




In most states with judicial processes, review and adjustment can be slow, costly, and 
cumbersome. Typically, obtaining relief requires a motion be brought in court. As a 
practical matter, few noncustodial parents with low or decreased incomes can afford 
to hire an attorney to bring a motion for a child support order reduction. 
 
If states want to ensure that child support awards reflect the current ability of the 
noncustodial parent to pay, they should implement more efficient and effective means 
for the review and adjustment of child support awards when the financial circumstances 
of noncustodial parents change. One method to accomplish this is for states to establish 
simple administrative processes for review and adjustment. Simple administrative 
processes are utilized in other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, to readily 
adjust child support awards based upon current income.45 New Zealand has a process 
whereby noncustodial parents can initiate adjustments if income changes. The 
noncustodial parent simply files a form showing the decrease in income and estimating 
the annual income for the year. The change in the child support order amount is 
automatic, and the agency checks the accuracy of the estimate at year end when actual 
annual income is known. An adjustment, called a “square-up”, is then made if the 
estimate was not accurate.  








Alaska has had recent success with the implementation of the Electronic 
Adjustment (ELMO) of child support orders.46 ELMO uses automated sources 
to capture income information and to automate the review and adjustment 
process. Project results from ELMO were significant, including a four-fold 
increase in the number of reviews. Over two-thirds (68 percent) of orders 
targeted for adjustment by ELMO (where at least one party agreed to pursue the 
action) were modified. The resulting modified orders better reflected the 
obligor’s ability to pay.  
 
West Virginia’s Expedited Review and Adjustment Process 
 
In 1999, West Virginia enacted a state law providing for an expedited review and 
adjustment process. A unique aspect of this process is that it is available only for 
substantial changes in circumstances due to employment changes. Changes are 
limited to: 1) decreases in income due to loss of employment, lay-off, reduction 
in hours, or other involuntary cause; or 2) increases in income due to promotion, 
change in employment, re-employment, etc. 
The expedited process differs from the usual process in that there is no hearing 
unless the other party files an objection. The expedited process provides for 
filing a petition along with documentation of the change in employment status. 
The child support obligation is recalculated, and an order can be entered 
administratively unless a party objects and requests a hearing. 
 
 
Review and modification is a prospective remedy. The “Bradley Amendment” under 
U.S. law makes unpaid child support a judgment by operation of law. It prohibits courts 
from retroactive modification of arrearages. However, this Amendment is directed at 
courts, not parties (and the state is a party for TANF arrearages). Therefore, it still allows 
room for compromise of arrearages in certain circumstances. A recent Office of Child 
Support Enforcement (OCSE) policy directive provides guidance on the forgiveness of 
arrears.47 It provides that, while arrears cannot be retroactively modified, parties can 
agree to compromise arrears on the same grounds as any other judgment in the state. 
The directive also points out that states can forgive arrears when parents marry or 
remarry the obligor. This strategy is designed to financially assist couples who desire to 
marry. This is currently a state option, but could be made a mandatory requirement for 
the program. 





Review and Adjustment 
Recommended Practices 
 
9 Congress should require states to conduct review and adjustments of all child support 
orders at least every three years or upon exiting TANF. 
9 Child support agencies should automate their processes for review and adjustment to 
the greatest extent feasible. 
9 States should adopt administrative or expedited processes for review and adjustment. 
Expedited processes (such as those in West Virginia) allowing expedited reviews due 
to changes in employment status would make the system fairer to low-income 
noncustodial parents who frequently experience employment changes. 
9 Child support agencies should treat custodial parent and noncustodial parent requests 
for review and modification equally, and adjust order amounts downward as well as 
upward. 
9 Child support agencies should review thresholds for reviews outside the three year cycle 
(cases where a review and adjustment has been made in the past three years) and 
reduce excessive thresholds. 
9 Child support agencies should review thresholds for three year cycle reviews (cases where 
no review and adjustment has been made in the past three years) and eliminate 
thresholds for these reviews. 
9 Congress should mandate that arrears owed to the state are forgiven upon marriage by 
the parents. 
 







Child support is an important source of financial support for low-income, single parent 
families—usually headed by mothers. Child support has become even more critical in the 
post-welfare reform era. Having the financial support from both parents can make a 
difference to families with children struggling to make the transition from welfare to 
work and self-sufficiency.  In addition, children in these families should receive strong 
emotional support from, and have a connection with, their fathers. 
 
The child support system needs to do a better job in how it works with low-income 
fathers. The analysis in this report concludes that three specific changes to the child 
support system are of particular importance—reducing default orders, setting realistic 
child support orders at the outset, and making adjustments to orders to reflect changes 
in circumstances. These improvements will make the system more fair and equitable to 
low-income noncustodial fathers, while increasing their voluntary compliance with 
current support obligations. 
 
Too often child support enforcement has been portrayed as an adversary of low-income 
fathers, and sometimes with good reason. However, the interaction between child 
support agencies and fathers does not have to be an adversarial one. Child support 
programs can be a positive influence on fathers and increase their ability to provide both 
financial and emotional support to their children if the programs focus on improving the 
up-front processes and focus on getting fathers started on the right track.  
 




SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendations for State and Local Program Action 
 
Establishing Realistic Expectations for Low-Income Fathers 
 
9 Child support agencies should limit imputing income—both as to the amount and 
the circumstances under which it will impute income (i.e., voluntary unemployment 
or voluntary underemployment). 
9 Child support agencies should limit imputing income by reserving orders or setting 
zero orders in cases where no income information is obtained and review the case 
after 30, 60, or 90 days. 
9 Child support agencies should expand the use of automated location sources for 
income information.  
9 Child support agencies should promote an agency culture centered on obtaining 
“good orders” that include active involvement of the noncustodial parent and are 
based on accurate income information. 
9 Child support agencies should ensure that internal productivity standards do not 
contribute to high default order rates. 
9 Child support agencies should track jurisdiction default rates to assess whether there 
are any problems contributed by poor service of process. 
9 Child support agencies should promote communications with noncustodial parents 
that facilitate a better understanding of the nature and significance of the child 
support matter. 
9 Child support agencies should make use of the telephone and drop-ins to obtain 
more information from noncustodial parents on location and income. This is also an 
opportunity to educate noncustodial parents on their responsibilities. 
9 Child support agencies should re-write service of process documents to make them 
easily understandable. 
9 Child support agencies should ensure that documents are available in the language 
spoken by the noncustodial parent.  
9 Child support agencies should have interpreters readily accessible. 
9 Child support agencies should use simple cover forms and “YOU MUST APPEAR” 
language to emphasize importance of documents. 
9 Child support agencies should either encourage stipulations or encourage personal 
appearance before the ad judicatory body setting the obligation.  
9 Child support agencies should use informal responses as an opportunity to avoid 
defaults by encouraging stipulations or participation in the proceedings. 
9 Child support agencies should make courthouses and offices easily accessible. 
9 Child support agencies should require appearance by giving noncustodial parents a 
time and date certain to appear for appointments or court hearings. 




9 Child support agencies should require orders to show cause and bench warrants to 
compel attendance in paternity cases. 
9 Child support agencies should require a default hearing prior to entering default 
orders. 
9 Child support agencies should use multiple notices to the noncustodial parent prior 
to entering orders. 
9 Child support agencies should require personal service and not substitute service for 
paternity cases. 
9 Child support agencies should use multiple means of service, such as service by mail 
in addition to personal service. 
9 Child support agencies should carefully monitor the actions of process servers to 
ensure proper service of process.  
9 Child support agencies should use the telephone to call custodial parents, 
noncustodial parents and employers for locate information prior to making service 
attempts. 
9 Child support agencies should use all automated locate sources available. 
9 Child support agencies should encourage direct communication between 
caseworkers and process servers. 
9 Child support agencies should use special staff or private contractors to provide 
additional locate information in difficult cases. 
9 Child support agencies should reduce, eliminate, or cap front-end fees and add-on 
costs charged to low-income noncustodial parents. 
 
Encouraging Voluntary Compliance with Child Support Obligations 
 
9 Child support agencies should consider case sorting as a means to provide client 
services tailored to the status of the case. 
9 Child support agencies should provide more intensive case management services to 
low-income fathers. 
9 Child support agencies should make customer service a high priority, and develop an 
organizational structure and policies and procedures supportive of this mission.  
9 Child support agencies should ensure that staff are trained and encouraged to treat 
low-income noncustodial parents in a customer-friendly manner. 
9 Child support agencies should make special educational and informational efforts to 
encourage voluntary compliance with child support obligations. 
9 Child support agencies should design procedures to monitor cases from the time the 
first payment is due, and take early intervention action as soon as payments are 
missed. 
9 Child support agencies should use automatic ticklers to notify caseworkers when 
payments are missed. 




9 Child support agencies should regularly offer referrals to programs for employment 
services, job training, substance abuse treatment, mediation and family counseling, 
and parenting education.  
9 Child support agencies should develop relationships with community-based 
organizations in order to provide referrals for services to fathers. 
9 Child support agencies should consider suspending payments while fathers are 
participating in responsible fatherhood programs, training or educational activities. 
 
Responding to the Changing Circumstances of Low-Income Parents 
 
9 Child support agencies should consider making default orders provisional or 
temporary to permit changes if the noncustodial parent appears and provides actual 
income information   
9 Alternatively, child support agencies should consider allowing vacating or default 
orders, extending the time limit for modification of default orders, or expungement 
of arrears. 
9 Child support agencies should automate their processes for review and adjustment to 
the greatest extent feasible. 
9 Child support agencies should treat custodial parent and noncustodial parent 
requests for review and modification equally, and adjust order amounts downward as 
well as upward. 
9 Child support agencies should review their thresholds for reviews outside the three-
year cycle (cases where a review and adjustment has been made in the past three 
years) and reduce excessive thresholds. 
9 Child support agencies should review thresholds for three-year cycle reviews (cases 
where no review and adjustment has been made in the past three years) and eliminate 
thresholds for these reviews. 
 
Recommendations for State Legislatures 
 
Establishing Realistic Expectations for Low-Income Fathers 
 
9 States should use state guideline reviews to reexamine the financial expectation of 
low-income noncustodial parents and ensure that they pay an equitable percentage of 
their income as compared to higher-income noncustodial parents. 
9 States should consider adding low-income adjustments to their guidelines, or revising 
their existing low-income adjustment, to better consider noncustodial parents’ ability 
to pay. States also should consider how the addition of child care and the child’s 
medical expenses to the base support amount would affect low-income noncustodial 
parents, and further depart from the father’s ability to pay. 
9 States should use guidelines reviews to reassess adjustments for multiple families, 
particularly as they apply to low-income noncustodial parents. 




9 States should limit minimum orders to cases where the noncustodial parent has the 
realistic capability of making a current financial contribution. 
9 States should consider limiting the amount of minimum orders to no more than the 
amount passed-through and disregarded for welfare purposes. 
9 States should limit retroactive support by capping the period of retroactivity or 
restricting retroactive support only to cases when the noncustodial parent has 
attempted to evade legal authorities. 
9 States should eliminate respondent filing fees. 
 
Encouraging Voluntary Compliance w2ith Child Support Obligations 
 
9 States should increase the amount of pass-through and disregard that welfare families 
can receive.  
9 States should experiment with economic incentives to encourage payment of child 
support. 
9 States should use available federal and state funds for demonstration programs to 
provide services to noncustodial parents with the goal of increasing financial and 
emotional support to children. 
 
Responding to the Changing Circumstances of Low-Income Parents 
 
9 States should adopt administrative or expedited processes for review and adjustment.  
 
Recommendations for Federal Action 
 
Establishing Realistic Expectations for Low Income Fathers -
 
9 Congress should create a National Guidelines Commission to examine and make 
recommendations on state guidelines, including levels and adequacy of support 
amounts, treatment of multiple families, whether more uniformity in terms and 
guideline amounts is desirable, imputing income, minimum orders, retroactive 
support, and child care and medical support interaction. 
9 Congress should amend the Social Security Act to preclude State IV-D agencies from 
attempting to recover Medicaid birthing costs. 
 
Encouraging Voluntary Compliance with Child Support Obligations 
 
9 Congress should change the child support funding system to provide incentives for 
states to pass-through and disregard child support to families on welfare.  
9 Congress should repeal the tax refund offset exception to “family first” distribution. 
9 Congress should fund demonstration programs providing services to noncustodial 
parents with the goal of increasing financial and emotional support to children. 





Responding to the Changing Circumstances of Low-Income Parents 
 
9 Congress should require states to conduct reviews and adjustments of all child 
support orders at least every three years or upon exiting TANF. 
9 Congress should mandate that arrears owed to the state are forgiven upon marriage 
by the parents. 
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